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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 







MARK S. FRAZIER, 




CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2:17-cv-04597) 
District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 4, 2018 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., BIBAS and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 







                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




In a second amended complaint (“the Complaint”), Mark Frazier purported to sue 
various parties alleged to have stolen Frazier’s intellectual property, the sale of which 
was allegedly used to fund a years-long harassment campaign against him.  Frazier’s 
pleading appeared to raise claims for wrongful arrest and other civil rights violations, as 
well as claims for copyright infringement. 
The District Court, having granted Frazier permission to proceed in forma 
pauperis, screened the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  The District Court 
dismissed the Complaint, with prejudice, for failure to state a viable claim, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and for being “abusive of the judicial process” and thus “malicious” 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), insofar as Frazier previously litigated cases based on 
identical allegations of fact.  The District Court, moreover, concluded that any further 
attempts by Frazier to amend his pleading would be futile.  This appeal followed. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a dismissal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is de novo. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 
2000).  Our review of a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), is for abuse of 
discretion unless the District Court applied legal precepts (in which case it is de novo). 
See Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995).  Our review of the 
District Court’s refusal to permit additional amendment of a pleading is for abuse of 
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discretion, but a determination that amendment would be futile is reviewed de novo. U.S. 
ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014).  
On appeal, Frazier focuses on the District Court’s dismissal of the Copyright Act 
claims.1  Those claims were adequately pleaded, Frazier contends, as he used the very 
“format provided by the 2004 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Br. at 2.  According to 
Frazier, “all a plaintiff needs to do [to adequately plead a copyright infringement claim] 
is to have [his] work registered with the U.S. copyright office and plead that the work 
was copied without authorization.” Br. at 3.  We disagree with Frazier’s assessment, for 
the reasons given below, and otherwise conclude that Frazier failed to state a claim.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the Complaint.2 
                                              
1 Frazier’s opening brief does not address in any meaningful way the District Court’s 
legal determinations as to his civil rights claims—those determinations variously being 
that the claims were not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or lacked sufficient 
supporting factual material, or were subject to an immunity doctrine, or were plainly 
time-barred.  Frazier thus has waived challenges he might have brought to those 
determinations. See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 
26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived unless a party raises it in its 
opening brief, and for those purposes ‘a passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice 
to bring that issue before this court.’”) (citation omitted); see also Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 
296 F.3d 184, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (applying waiver doctrine to pro se 
appeal).  Even absent waiver, though, we would affirm the dismissal of Frazier’s civil 
rights claims for substantially the reasons given in the District Court’s opinion. 
 
2 In light of this disposition, we do not reach the issue of the District Court’s 
‘maliciousness’ determination under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  In addition, we note 
that Frazier’s appeal of the District Court’s subsequently issued order declining to recuse 
(CA No. 18-1371) will be addressed in a separate opinion. 
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Dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is proper if the pleading party fails 
to allege sufficient factual matter that, if accepted as true, could “state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Tourscher v. McCullough, 
184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  While this “plausibility standard” is not a “probability 
requirement,” it does call for the pleading to show “more than a sheer possibility that the 
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  In that vein, the pleading party 
must allege “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal 
evidence of the necessary element[s]” of her claim. Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 
F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   
A plaintiff wishing to adequately plead a copyright infringement claim, 
specifically, must plausibly allege both: “(1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) 
unauthorized copying of original elements of the plaintiff’s work.” Dun & Bradstreet 
Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2002).  To 
satisfy that second element, the plaintiff must supply plausible allegations of fact 
“showing not only that the defendant had access to a copyrighted work, but also that there 
are substantial similarities” between the original work and the one purportedly produced 
via plagiarism. Dam Things from Denmark, a/k/a Troll Co. ApS, v. Russ Berrie & Co., 
Inc., 290 F.3d 548, 561 (3d Cir. 2002).3   




With all of that in mind, we turn to Frazier’s Complaint.  Despite multiple 
opportunities to fix the defects in his copyright infringement claims, Frazier provided 
almost no details about the “several original works of authorship,” Compl. at ¶ 2, he 
allegedly registered with the U.S. Copyright Office.  He offered only a generalized, 
exemplary list of his copyrighted “wares.” See Compl. at ¶ 5 (listing the “ITDSC ‘Do-It-
Yourself-In-Minutes’ Portable Fireplace Generation Technique” as one of the “wares”).  
But Frazier did attach to his pleading an exhibit purportedly reflecting search results from 
the U.S. Copyright Office’s online database, and those results show at least superficially 
that Frazier is the owner of several copyrights.  With a third chance to amend, then, 
Frazier may have been able to plausibly plead the element of valid copyright ownership. 
Nevertheless, the District Court was correct that another opportunity for Frazier to 
amend would be futile.  For even with the liberal construction afforded to the pro se 
draftsman, the allegations in the Complaint at most suggest only that certain defendants 
dispossessed Frazier of his “laptop” and one or more “flash drives,” and that on each 
device was stored copyrighted material. Compl. at ¶ 10 & “Discussion.”4 Without factual 
material related to an ostensibly copyright-infringing work produced by any of the 
                                              
3 Contrary to Frazier’s position, see Br. at 3, a threadbare recitation of these elements will 
not suffice, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted); the allegations must set forth facts 
(not legal conclusions), id., and they must be plausible, see Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 
352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The touchstone of the pleading standard is plausibility.”).    
4 Frazier’s allegation that the defendants “converted plaintiff[’s] intellectual property 
titles,” Compl. at ¶ 10, is at best an incredibly vague assertion of fact, and at worst a bald 
conclusion of law to be ignored when making a determination under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).   
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defendants, however, the allegations do not raise a reasonable expectation that discovery 
will reveal evidence supporting the “copying” element of a copyright infringement claim. 
See Grace Consulting, 307 F.3d at 206; Dam Things from Denmark, 290 F.3d at 561.   
For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.        
 
